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o. 'ne of the peculiar aspects of my re-
turn to the monetary policymaking arena
has been the media's interest in labeling
me a "hawk" or "dove," or someone who
is anti-inflation or pro-growth. I regular-
ly receive calls from reporters when eco-
nomic statistics are released asking
about my reactions to the numbers so that
they can speculate on how I might vote
at the next Federal Open Market Com-
mittee meeting. "Fedwatchers" — a
fraternity I once belonged to — other
market participants, and the media
have increasingly focused on interpret-
ing policymakers' actions and on the
minutiae of implementing policy. This
focus has contributed to confusion
about what monetary policy can and
cannot do and has added to the age-old
confusion between money and credit.
Tonight I will argue that this obsession
with the details of implementing policy
has detracted from long-term policy
goals. I will present my views on the
essential principles underlying mone-
tary policy and describe what monetary
policy can and cannot achieve. Finally,
I will give my prescription for what a
central bank should focus on.
The America's Cup trials, currently
under way in San Diego Bay, can serve
to illustrate the problem of communi-
cating the logic behind monetary policy
formulation and implementation. If you
have had the opportunity to watch the
television coverage of this preeminent
sailing race, you know that it is rather
difficult to discern how a yacht is doing
relative to the finish line because its
bow is almost never pointing toward
the ultimate destination, or even toward
the next buoy.
Television viewers most often are
given two vantage points of the race:
One camera, affixed to the mast, is
focused on the actions of the crew
and the captain. Watching the opera-
tions of the crew provides no infor-
mation about the boat's progress
along the course of the race. For that,
we must go to a camera located in a
blimp high above. But even well
above the fray, the course of the race
is difficult to follow, and the progress
toward the finish line may appear to
be unclear. Depending on the wind,
the boats will be tacking first in one
direction and then in another. The
television commentator helps by
drawing lines on the screen that mark
the course line, the relative position
of the boats, and the ultimate destina-
tion. The helmsmen exercise a consid-
erable amount of judgment, while
abiding by age-old principles of sail-
ing, to reach the finish line.
In a recent speech, Jerry L. Jordan,
the new president of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Cleveland, laid out his
views on the essential principles under-
lying monetary policy, described what
monetary policy can and cannot accom-
plish, and discussed what a central
bank's primary focus should be. This
Economic Commentary is based on
President Jordan's address.
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The implementation of monetary policy
actions has much in common with sailing.
Just as watching the crew adjust the sails
provides little information about a boat's
destination, the technicalities surrounding
the monetary policy process provide few
clues about the outcome. And just as the
principles of sailing go back to the time
of the Vikings, the principles of monetary
policy date back at least to Henry Thorn-
ton in the early nineteenth century. Thorn-
ton, an English banker and economist,
recognized and clearly articulated the
dangers associated with a volatile money
supply. In particular, he linked changes in
the supply of available money and credit
to the general price level. Leading schol-
ars, including Milton Friedman, have
periodically restated these basic princi-
ples, which unfortunately are often over-
looked or perhaps forgotten by some Fed-
watchers and financial journalists.
In 1967, Milton Friedman, in his Presi-
dential Address to the American Eco-
nomic Association, presented a clear
description of the role of monetary pol-
icy. He began by reminding his audience
about the limitations of monetary policy;
that is, it cannot be used to produce real
goods and services or to create employ-
ment. Furthermore, it cannot peg either
the real interest rate or the unemployment
rate. Rather, monetary policy can create
an environment in which the economy
will operate most efficiently. Ignoring
this contribution, as central banks have
done at times in the past, can have dis-
astrous consequences.
• The Phillips Curve Illusion
Output is negatively correlated with
inflation over the long run. At any point
in time, however, it may appear that
output and inflation have a positive
relationship. Indeed, this positive short-
run correlation, known as the Phillips
curve, underlies most public discussion
of monetary policy. It is worthwhile to
reconsider the history of this relationship.
In 1958, New Zealand economist A.W.
Phillips noted an apparent inverse rela-
tionship between unemployment and
real wages. He observed that an in-
crease in real wages tended to be asso-
ciated with a decline in unemployment.
Such an association should be expected
as employers respond to a shrinking
pool of unemployed workers: We expect
the price of labor to increase when the
relative demand for labor rises.
However, the logic fails if this relation-
ship is viewed in terms of money wages.
There is no obvious reason to think
that a rise in the money wage would be
associated with a shrinking labor pool.
Nevertheless, as an empirical matter,
economists noted that changes in nom-
inal wages were also inversely related
to unemployment for the period Phillips
considered.
Unfortunately, macroeconomists inap-
propriately replaced changes in the
nominal wage with general inflation to
develop the relationship we know as
the Phillips curve.
But the Phillips curve is an illusion.
The data used were from an earlier
period, 1861 to 1959, in which the
price level fluctuated, but without a
secular trend such as the United States
has experienced since World War II. Be-
cause there really wasn't much infla-
tion on balance prior to 1959, we
should not be surprised to see a Phillips
curve in the data. When people expect
price stability, perceived real wages
will equal money wages.
However, this equality disappears in an
inflationary environment. On occasion
over the last 30 years, policymakers
have tried to exploit the Phillips curve
to lower the jobless rate, even though
the simple inverse relationship between
inflation and unemployment does not
exist. Indeed, the common experience
in the United States and Europe is the
opposite. With rising inflation, un-
employment has also risen, and it has
reached the highest levels in countries
that have had the most inflation. Yet,
the financial press, many members of
the Congress and the Administration,
and perhaps some of you here tonight
continue to use the Phillips curve frame-
work when thinking about the effects of
monetary policy.
This has been particularly evident dur-
ing the past two years of weak or con-
tracting economic growth. Financial
market participants have become condi-
tioned to the idea that monetary policy-
makers will "ease" policy, or cut the
federal funds rate, following reports
suggesting a weak economy. The most
notorious indicator is the monthly un-
employment rate, or its companion
report, nonfarm employment. There are
numerous examples where a cut in the
federal funds rate was linked by the
financial press to the announcement of
weak real variables. On four occasions
between December 1990 and December
1991, the federal funds rate was reduced
on the same day that weak employment
data were released, and on one occasion
the rate was lowered three business days
following the release of discouraging em-
ployment numbers.
One problem with easing when these
measures are weak is that traders then
believe that the inverse is also true —
policymakers will "tighten" following
reports of strength. On April 26, 1990,
bond prices fell sharply, reportedly
because of expectations that the first-
quarter gross national product data, due
out the following day, would indicate a
stronger-than-expected economy that
would lead the Federal Reserve to
tighten monetary policy.
• Controlling Real Interest Rates
The Fed cannot control real variables,
such as the level of employment. Like-
wise, it cannot control the real interest
rate, the rate that matters for real activ-
ity. Real interest rates will rise when
the marginal rate of return to capital
increases. They will also rise when
people become more impatient to con-
sume now rather than in the future.On one occasion toward the end of the
1970s, I was testifying before a con-
gressional committee responsible for
oversight of the Federal Reserve and
monetary policy. Another witness (an
eminent professor from a major univer-
sity and, subsequently, a Nobel Prize
winner) said that interest rates were too
high and that the Federal Reserve
should increase the money supply at a
faster rate and push interest rates down.
When my turn came, I said, "That's not
the way it works. Look at what happens
in the U.S. Treasury bill futures market
on Friday mornings, after the Thursday
night money numbers are released. If it
is reported that there is a big increase
in the money supply (compared to what
was expected), the prices of futures
contracts fall and interest rates rise. If
there is only a small increase (or a de-
cline) in the money supply, security
prices rise and interest rates fall. It's
just the opposite of what they teach in
the classroom."
The professor then responded that the
LM curve needed to be shifted to the
right.' At that point, I could tell that
we were not going to have the kind of
debate that would persuade members
of the U.S. Congress or the American
public that the Federal Reserve cannot
reduce interest rates by expanding the
money supply. His simplistic, incorrect
notion — that faster growth of the
money supply results in lower market
interest rates — is still with us today.
I would not hesitate to explain to a high
school economics class that the reason
Brazil and other countries in Latin
America experienced high nominal inter-
est rates in past decades is that they
had very high inflation resulting from
excessively rapid money growth. Con-
versely, the reason countries like Swit-
zerland, Germany, and Japan had low
nominal interest rates was that they had
low inflation stemming from slow
money growth. Yet, somehow we have
not been able to persuade journalists
and members of the Congress that
rapid money growth causes high inter-
est rates and slow money growth
produces low interest rates.
• What Monetary Policy Can Do
Since we know that monetary policy
cannot control the real interest rate or
the unemployment rate, the obvious
question is, What can it do? As Fried-
man explained so clearly back in 1967,
monetary policy can achieve two ob-
jectives. First, it can avoid being a
source of economic disturbances. Sec-
ond, it can foster sustainable high real
growth by stabilizing the aggregate
price level. These two objectives are
related. Failing to stabilize the price
level is itself a source of uncertainty
and risk in our economy that ultimate-
ly depresses output and employment.
Friedman concluded his discussion of
monetary policy with a call for mone-
tary targeting. During the late 1960s
and early 1970s (while working at the
St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank), I was
associated with an effort to persuade
people, both inside and outside mone-
tary policy circles, to pay more atten-
tion to the money supply. However,
using the money supply as a target
instrument for formulating and imple-
menting monetary policy actions (ver-
sus as an indicator variable summariz-
ing the thrust of those actions) has
not advanced much during the more
than 16 years I have been out of
policymaking circles.
The challenge today still is to focus on
the long-run issues. Just as the captain
of a sailboat cannot control either the
direction or force of the wind, the water
currents, or the chop of the waves,
neither can the Federal Reserve control
the real variables that receive so much
attention. To return to my analogy, we
should expect the crew to do its job,
but if we want to understand where the
yacht is headed, we should not dwell
on the action on the deck. Instead, we
should take the view from the blimp
and study the commentator's course
line so that we can see where monetary
policy and the economy are headed.
• What a Central Bank
Should Focus On
Knowing the long-term objectives of
monetary policy is critical for success-
ful planning, whether you are an indi-
vidual planning for retirement or a cor-
poration planning for the next century.
U.S. corporations are often criticized for
being shortsighted. Suggestions are fre-
quently made for the federal govern-
ment to adopt an industrial policy or
other mechanisms to produce better out-
comes. Yet, the government and its
agencies have failed to provide the
most important basic building block
for improved, private market-driven
planning. That, of course, is a credible
commitment to price stability, which
would produce low and steady nominal
interest rates.
If the policy process is well managed,
prosperity will follow. In general,
average output growth will be higher
the lower the average inflation rate and
the less the uncertainty about future
prices. This occurs for many reasons.
Increased uncertainty about the future
price level leads to a waste of resources
and suboptimal decision-making. For
example, we so far have failed to index
tax rates on the income generated from
the capital stock. Even with a 4 percent
inflation rate, an 8 percent market inter-
est rate, and a 35 percent tax on income
from capital, the effective tax rate on real
income from capital is 70 percent.
Another consequence of vague long-term
objectives and tenuous commitments is
the obsession of the media with the minu-
tiae of policy — daily open-market opera-
tions, weekly changes in the monetary
aggregates, short-run changes in the fed-
eral funds rate, employment reports, and
so on. The focus on the short run has
caused an undue preoccupation with the
Phillips curve. Not only have people
begun to assign the Fed responsibility for
the business cycle, but the press has trans-
formed the debate into a conflict over the
perceived short-term effects of policy.
The classification of monetary policy-
makers as hawks or doves is misplaced
and is entirely a consequence of the
failure to produce long-term plans. Poli-
cies that deliver low inflation will deliver
low interest rates. Artificially pushingdown the federal funds rate will not
bring about lower bond yields and
mortgage rates. Indeed, on several oc-
casions in the past few years, a cut in
the federal funds rate resulted in higher
long-term interest rates.
The effects of monetary policy actions are
difficult to gauge, even when we observe
monetary growth averaged over a year.
The annual targeting exercise still in-
cludes considerable tacking. As we
learned in the early 1980s, the winds pick
up. and tacking becomes more critical
when the Fed tries to reduce the inflation
trend. Missing are the buoys and the TV
commentator with a course line drawn
for M2 or a price index. M2 velocity has
been relatively stable for the last 30 years,
making me willing to rely on it as a long-
run guide for policy actions. Yet, changes
in the tides and currents of financial mar-
kets cause changes in the components of
a broad monetary aggregate such as M2.
The seasoned hand at the tiller must
know when to make near-term adjust-
ments without altering the basic course.
In 1967, Milton Friedman argued that
money was a good short-run target. I
think it still is. However, if we are
drawing a course line to define the
standard for price stability, then per-
haps we ought to do it with some meas-
ure of prices. Such a course line would
not prohibit the Fed from tacking into
the wind. However, it would shift the
focus of the camera away from the
activity of the sailors and put it on the
long-run course of the economy. That
does not mean that Fedwatchers like
you would lose interest in seeing how
we set the sails and tie the knots. But
members of the Congress, the Admin-
istration, and the financial press would
not be focusing on variables that the
Fed has no control over, unnecessarily
rocking the boat.
• Footnote
1. Students of money and banking will
remember that an LM curve is the interest
rate-real output combinations that define
equilibrium in the money market. L refers
to the demand for money, or liquidity prefer-
ences, and M represents the supply of money.
President Jordan presented this speech to
The Money Marketeers of New York Univer-
sity on May 4. 1992.
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